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Abstract
This paper provides formulas for optimal top marginal tax rates when couples are
taxed according to income splitting between spouses, consumption is taxed, and the skill
distribution is unbounded. Optimal top marginal income tax rates are computed for
Germany using a dataset that includes the tax returns of all German top taxpayers. We
nd that the optimal top marginal tax rate converges to about 2/3 and convergence
obtains at income levels that are substantially higher than those currently subject to the
actual top tax rate.
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1 Introduction
Recent increases in the income concentration at the top of the distribution and concerns
about public debts of unprecedented heights have generated much research and policy
interest in the taxation of very high incomes.1 Since actual tax codes include a top
marginal tax rate that applies to incomes above a certain threshold, a crucial issue for
tax policy is to determine what the optimal level of that top marginal tax rate is. The
early literature on optimal income taxation delivered a deceiptively simple answer to that
question: in its basic model, the optimal marginal tax rate on the highest income level
is zero. However, as pointed out by e.g. Tuomala (1984) and Diamond (1998), the zero-
taxation result has to be interpreted with great caution. Its policy application requires
ex-ante knowledge of the maximum income subject to taxation and optimal marginal
tax rates need not approach zero until very close to that maximum. If one captures
governments ignorance about the top income distribution by positing an unbounded
distribution of skills, the optimal asymptotic marginal tax rate is instead positive and
depends on the shape of the distribution. Saez (2001) o¤ers a formula of such an optimal
top marginal tax rate as a function of substitution and income e¤ects as well as the
thickness of the top tail of the income distribution. That formula provides an ideal
starting point for the analysis of optimal top marginal income tax rates and the way in
which tax policy should react to changing trends in top income inequality.2
This paper contributes to the literature on optimal tax rates for top incomes by devel-
oping novel extensions to Saezs formulas and by providing novel estimations of optimal
top tax rates. Existing formulas for the optimal top marginal income tax rate do not dis-
tinguish between taxation of singles and taxation of couples. Such a distinction is crucial
for tax systems that have joint taxation with income splitting for spouses. Joint taxation
of couples with income splitting is practised in various countries, for instance in Germany
and France. This paper o¤ers a formula for the optimal top marginal income tax rate
under such a tax system and shows how it relates to existing formulas. Furthermore, we
examine how the presence of a consumption tax a¤ects the optimal top marginal income
tax rate. Our empirical contribution is to employ high-quality data to estimate the op-
timal top marginal rate of the income tax for the case of Germany. The unique feature
1On the evolution of top incomes, see Atkinson and Piketty (2010). Early works on the taxation of
top incomes are Slemrod (1994) and Feenberg and Poterba (2000).
2As documented by Sabirianova Peter et al. (2010), there has been a worldwide decline in top marginal
tax rates in the period 1981-2005. However, in the wake of the current nancial crisis, some European
governments have decided to raise their top tax rates.
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of the dataset we use is that it includes all taxpayers in the top percentile of the German
income distribution.
When couples are taxed according to the method of joint taxation with splitting, the
spousesincomes are added together and taxed as if each earned one half of their total
income. The income cuto¤for taxation at the top marginal tax rate is for couples twice the
level that applies to single taxpayers. We derive a formula for the optimal top marginal
tax rate that depends on the elasticities and income distributions of both couples and
singles in the economy. It is shown that in the special case where they have identical
asymptotic elasticities, the optimal top tax rate can be written as in Saez (2001) once the
Pareto parameter is re-interpreted as a properly modied weighted average of the Pareto
parameters of the respective distributions for singles and couples. When consumption is
taxed along with income, the optimal top marginal income tax rate has to be adjusted
correspondingly. We derive a simple formula that takes the existence of a consumption
tax into account which di¤ers from the one mentioned in Saez (2001).
The empirical part of this paper applies the optimal tax fomulas obtained in the
theoretical part in order to assess what the optimal taxation of top incomes is in Germany,
a country where top taxpayers often are couples and where consumption is relatively
heavily taxed. Our computations are based on an administrative dataset that includes
the individual tax returns of all taxpayers in the top percentile of the German income
distribution of the years 2004 and 2005. Labor supply elasticities for taxpayers at the
top of the income distribution are estimated using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel. A microsimulation model is used to compute their burden in terms of consumption
taxes. We nd that the optimal top marginal tax rate for Germany converges to about
2/3 and that convergence obtains at an income cuto¤ for singles of about 350,000 e. As
compared to actual taxation of top incomes in Germany, the optimal asymptotic marginal
tax rate is substantially higher and it only applies to a subset of those incomes that are
currently subject to the top marginal tax rate of the actual German tax code.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 extends Saez (2001)s
formulas to the cases of income splitting for spouses and taxation of consumption expen-
ditures. Section 3 implements those formulas empirically for the German case. Section 4
discusses how our ndings should be qualied when thinking about policy implications.
Section 5 concludes.
3In 2005, the top marginal tax rate in Germany (inclusive of a solidarity surcharge) was about 45 %
and started at an income level of about 50,000 e for singles and 100,000 e for couples. Since 2007 there
exists an additional tax for incomes above 250,000 e (500,000 e for couples); the resulting top marginal
tax rate is about 48 %.
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2 Two simple extensions
As in Saez (2001), each household has a well-behaved utility function, dened on con-
sumption and leisure, that can be written as u(c; y), where c is consumption and y is
earnings, the only source of income in this model. Households di¤er according to their
productivity, which is their private information. Since we are only concerned with top
earners and assume that the social planner does not care about their marginal utility,
no additional assumption about householdspreferences is necessary. In particular, they
can be di¤erent for singles and couples. However, we assume that couples behave as a
unitary decision maker, which is a standard assumption in the taxation literature but has
not gone undisputed.4 We rst introduce couple taxation and then a consumption tax.
Whenever useful we attach an index S to variables that relate to single households and
an index C to variables that relate to couples.
2.1 Income splitting for spouses
There is a continuum of households whose mass is normalized to unity. Households may
be either single persons or couples. Let  denote the share of couples in the population of
tax units. The income of single individuals is taxed according to the tax schedule T (y),
while couples are taxed jointly with income splitting between spouses. A couple with
income y pays income tax equal to 2T (y=2).
The government sets a constant marginal tax rate  above a cuto¤ level of income y.
The income tax paid by single individuals with y  y equals T (y) + (y   y). Couples
are only a¤ected by the top marginal rate if their income exceeds 2y. In that case, their
income tax liability amounts to 2T (y)+(y 2y). For both household types, consumption
is related to earnings through c = y T (y). Thus, the consumption level of singles in the
top tax bracket is given by
c = y(1  ) +R; (1)
where
R = y   T (y):
Consumption of couples with y  2y is similarly given by
c = y(1  ) + 2R: (2)
Households in the top income tax bracket choose their earnings so as to maximize
their utility function subject to their respective budget constraints, (1) for singles and
4See e.g. Apps and Rees (2009) for a discussion of alternative cooperative and non-cooperative house-
hold models.
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(2) for couples. The result of the maximization problem is a earnings supply function
yS(1   ; R) for singles and yC(1   ; 2R) for couples.
In order to derive the optimal tax rate  , the mechanical and the behavioral e¤ect from
a small change d on the tax revenue are considered. The mechanical e¤ect is denoted
by M = (1  )MS + MC . One has
M = [(1  )(ymS   y) + (ymC   2y)] d ;
where ymS denotes the mean of incomes above y in the income distribution of singles and
ymC denotes the mean of incomes above 2y in the income distribution of couples.
The behavioral e¤ect B = (1 )BS +BC can be decomposed into two parts. First,
there is an overall uncompensated increase d in the marginal tax rate starting from 0.
Second, there is an increase in virtual income equal to dR = yd for singles and equal to
d2R = 2yd for couples. By the same steps as in Saez (2001), the resulting reduction in
tax receipts due to the behavioral responses equals




BC =  (uCymC   2Cy)
d
1  
for couples. Parameter u is the uncompensated labor supply elasticity and  captures
the income e¤ect as given by the Slutsky equation.
At the optimal  , assuming that it is interior, the sum ofM and B equals the monetary
valuation by the planner of the loss in marginal utility su¤ered by the top income earners.
Assuming that the planner does not care about the marginal utility of top earners - so
that the government aims at maximizing the tax revenue collected from those taxpayers
- the optimal tax rate is implicitly determined by M +B = 0 or

1   =
(1  )(ymS   y) + (ymC   2y)
(1  )(uSymS   Sy) + (uCymC   2Cy)
: (3)
This is the formula that we employ in the next Section to numerically determine optimal
top tax rates for Germany.
Computing  from (3) requires knowledge of the actual distribution of top incomes.
While such information is available for Germany, in other instances (3) may be too de-
manding in terms of data availability. Less data-demanding formulas can be derived
under additional assumptions. In the following we assume that (i) singles and couples in
the top tax bracket do not di¤er with respect to their compensated and uncompensated
elasticities and (ii) both the top earnings of singles and those of couples are distributed
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according to the Pareto law, but with possibly di¤erent Paretian alphas. The assumption
that top earnings are Pareto distributed means that there exists an income level k 2 (0; y]
such that





where F is the cumulative distribution function and y  k. A distinctive property of
Pareto distributions is that the average income above any income threshold is a constant
multiple of that threshold, independent of the level of the treshold. Formally, let Y (y) =R1
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where we have posited uS = 
u
C = 
u and S = C = . In the special case S = C = ,
the above expression boils down to
 =
1
1 + u   (  1) =
1
1 + u + (  1)c ;
which is the same formula as in Saez (2001). Also if the Paretian alpha di¤ers across
household groups, equation (5) yields a solution similar to the one in Saez (2001) but
where  is replaced by a function of the alphas in the two distributions. Specically, the
optimal top tax rate can be written as
 =
1
1 + u + (a  1)c ;
where
a =
SC   be  1 :
In the last expression, b  [(1  )S +2C ]=(1 + ) is the average alpha per person in
the overall population a¤ected by the top tax rate; e  [(1 )C +2S]=(1+) is the
average alpha per person in a ctive population where the alphas of the two groups have
been exchanged.
2.2 Taxation of consumption
We now generalize the formula for the optimal top tax rate to the case where also con-
sumption is taxed. In Saez (2001) it is suggested that an optimal income tax rate  derived
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from the standard model should be reduced to (1  t) in the presence of a consumption
tax at rate t. For the sake of comparison, we deal with the case of a model economy with
single individuals only; by a completely analogous approach, the obtained result can be
generalized to the setting studied above where there are couples taxed according to the
splitting method.
In the presence of a proportional consumption tax at rate t, household consumption
is related to earnings through
c(1 + t) = y   T (y);
where T (y) denotes the income tax schedule. The government optimally sets a constant
marginal tax rate  y above a given level of income y. Thus, the income tax paid by





[y(1   y) +  yy   T (y)] : (6)
Individuals in the top income tax bracket choose their earnings so as to maximize their
utility function u(c; y) subject to (6). That constraint can be written as
c = y(1  ) + eR;
where
 =
 y + t
1 + t
(7)
and eR = y   T (y) + ty
1 + t
:
This way of rewriting the budget constraint allows one to have a model which is equivalent
to the one in Saez (2001). Hence, the expressions for the optimal top tax rate derived in
that article are valid for the optimal  in the current model where consumption is taxed
at rate t. Using (7), the optimal income tax rate reads
 y =    (1  )t: (8)
Thus, the adjustment of the optimal income tax formula suggested by Saez (2001) is
accurate only in the special case  = 1=2 and the di¤erence can be considerable if  6= 1=2.
By way of an example, if  = 3=4 and t = 1=5, the optimal  y as implied by (8) is 70 %
while using the formula  y = (1  t) yields  y = 60%.5
5Alternatively, one can express the consumption tax rate in terms of its tax-inclusive base. If one
denotes by  that tax rate, the households budget contraint becomes c=(1   ) = y   T (y). The
equivalent formula to (8) is then y = (   )=(1  ).
6
3 Estimations for Germany
We now compute the optimal top tax rate as implied by (3) and (8) for selected levels of
the income cuto¤ y in the case of Germany. Since incomes that exceed a relatively low
threshold are not subject to social insurance contributions in Germany, those contributions
can safely be neglected.6 Our computations are based on administrative tax data that
include the individual tax returns of all taxpayers in the top percentile of the German
income distribution. The dataset that we use can be accessed to through the Research
Data Centre of the Federal Statistical O¢ ce of Germany. That dataset includes all income
components for each individual within a tax unit - a single person or a couple. We use the
most recent available information which is the one pertaining to the year 2005. Results
for the year 2004 are similar to those for 2005 and are reported in the Appendix.
3.1 Distribution of top incomes
The model used in Section 2 depicts earnings from the supply of labor, while capital
income and pure prots are neglected. Three measures of labor income can be recovered
from our dataset. The rst one only includes wages and salaries, i.e. income from depen-
dent employment. The second one adds to wages and salaries the income received from
professional services of the self-employed. The third measure additionally includes the
income from business enterprise. Going from the rst to the third measure, it is likely
that an increasing part of measured income can be attributed to capital and economic
rents rather than labor. Also risk taking is likely to be a more important determinant
of income for the self-employed rather than the wage earners. We shall therefore mainly
discuss the results based on our preferred income measure, namely wages and salaries.7
Figures 1 and 2 depict for each income measure its distribution in the population of,
respectively, singles and couples. Those Figures show the shape of Y (y)=y, the ratio of the
average income of all incomes above y to y. As noted above, that ratio is constant if the
underlying income distribution is the Pareto one. Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the top of
the German income distribution is rather well described by a Pareto distribution: starting
with yearly incomes of about 350,000 e for singles and 400,000 e for couples, the Y (y)=y
6The earning threshold in 2005 was about 62,000 e for old-age and unemployment insurance and
about 42,000 e for health-care insurance. Below, we set the minimum cuto¤ for taxation at the top
marginal tax rate at 50,000 e. Since the German social security system is of the Bismarckian variety,
contributions to the old-age and unemployment insurance only have a minor tax component.
7All measures refer to taxable income. We also performed the same empirical exercise using the
broader denition of income proposed in Bach et al. (2009). Optimal asymptotic marginal tax rates were
very close to the ones obtained here. Optimal top marginal tax rates were somewhat lower in the case
of an income threshold between 50,000 e and 100,000 e. Details are available from the authors upon
request.
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Figure 1: Singlesincome distribution
ratio is approximatively constant. However, the level of that ratio is signicantly higher
for the most comprehensive income measure, the one including income from business
enterprise. In terms of Paretian alphas, the  for the income distribution including
business income is about 1.5, while excluding it increases the alpha to about 2.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 show for each income measure the distribution of income above the
cuto¤ y for selected numerical values of that cuto¤.
3.2 Elasticities
We have estimated labor supply elasticities using data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel. Separate estimations for singles and couples have been conducted. In the case of
couples, the estimation is based on a household utility model. It is assumed that both
spouses jointly maximize a utility function that depends on leisure of both spouses and
net household income. Working hours include paid overtime and are modeled using the
discrete-choice framework proposed by van Soest (1995). Household budget constraints
for several hour categories are constructed using a detailed microsimulation model also
based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. Applying the estimated structural
parameters of the model and simulation methods, we have computed compensated and
uncompensated wage elasticities of hours worked by households in various intervals of the
8
Figure 2: Couplesincome distribution
Table 1: Wage Income
Singles Couples Total
y¯ nr. of obs. 2y¯ nr. of obs nr. of obs 
50,000 913,362 100,000 523,008 1,436,370 0.364
60,000 449,273 120,000 287,204 736,477 0.390
70,000 254,915 140,000 176,736 431,651 0.409
80,000 159,741 160,000 119,674 279,414 0.428
90,000 109,071 180,000 86,011 195,082 0.441
100,000 78,537 200,000 64,191 142,728 0.450
200,000 12,794 400,000 11,459 24,253 0.472
300,000 4,799 600,000 4,681 9,479 0.494
400,000 2,497 800,000 2,549 5,046 0.505
500,000 1,558 1,000,000 1,670 3,228 0.517
600,000 1,080 1,200,000 1,169 2,249 0.520
700,000 800 1,400,000 849 1,649 0.515
800,000 610 1,600,000 642 1,252 0.513
900,000 493 1,800,000 505 998 0.506
1,000,000 406 2,000,000 417 823 0.507
1,100,000 335 2,200,000 340 675 0.504
1,200,000 294 2,400,000 276 570 0.484
1,300,000 251 2,600,000 232 483 0.480
1,400,000 224 2,800,000 199 423 0.470
1,500,000 205 3,000,000 156 361 0.432
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Table 2: Wage and Professional Income
Singles Couples Total
y¯ nr. of obs. 2y¯ nr. of obs nr. of obs 
50,000 1,048,765 100,000 689,177 1,737,943 0.397
60,000 546,856 120,000 418,322 965,177 0.433
70,000 331,564 140,000 280,239 611,803 0.458
80,000 217,146 160,000 201,656 418,802 0.482
90,000 157,241 180,000 151,700 308,941 0.491
100,000 118,554 200,000 117,408 235,962 0.498
200,000 23,324 400,000 22,468 45,792 0.491
300,000 9,142 600,000 8,529 17,671 0.483
400,000 4,744 800,000 4,402 9,146 0.481
500,000 2,876 1,000,000 2,679 5,555 0.482
600,000 1,987 1,200,000 1,808 3,795 0.476
700,000 1,414 1,400,000 1,272 2,686 0.474
800,000 1,051 1,600,000 917 1,968 0.466
900,000 802 1,800,000 701 1,503 0.466
1,000,000 662 2,000,000 569 1,231 0.462
1,100,000 541 2,200,000 450 991 0.454
1,200,000 472 2,400,000 369 841 0.439
1,300,000 405 2,600,000 312 717 0.435
1,400,000 352 2,800,000 265 617 0.429
1,500,000 312 3,000,000 211 523 0.403
Table 3: Wage, Professional and Business Income
Singles Couples Total
y¯ nr. of obs. 2y¯ nr. of obs nr. of obs 
50,000 1,200,836 100,000 810,411 2,011,247 0.403
60,000 650,621 120,000 505,944 1,156,564 0.437
70,000 415,316 140,000 348,158 763,474 0.456
80,000 271,621 160,000 256,483 528,104 0.486
90,000 202,465 180,000 197,268 399,733 0.493
100,000 156,860 200,000 156,574 313,434 0.500
200,000 39,303 400,000 37,643 76,946 0.489
300,000 19,168 600,000 17,733 36,901 0.481
400,000 11,995 800,000 10,912 22,908 0.476
500,000 8,448 1,000,000 7,612 16,061 0.474
600,000 6,512 1,200,000 5,604 12,117 0.463
700,000 5,303 1,400,000 4,403 9,706 0.454
800,000 4,435 1,600,000 3,502 7,937 0.441
900,000 3,770 1,800,000 2,939 6,709 0.438
1,000,000 3,265 2,000,000 2,531 5,796 0.437
1,100,000 2,873 2,200,000 2,202 5,075 0.434
1,200,000 2,536 2,400,000 1,909 4,444 0.429
1,300,000 2,300 2,600,000 1,724 4,024 0.428
1,400,000 2,046 2,800,000 1,545 3,591 0.430
1,500,000 1,877 3,000,000 1,331 3,208 0.415
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income distribution.8 For the determination of the optimal top tax rate we are interested
in the labor supply elasticity of taxpayers with annual incomes of at least 50,000 e in case
of singles and 100,000 e in case of couples. According to our estimations, the average
uncompensated labor supply elasticity for singles with income larger than 50,000 e is 0.14
while the income e¤ect amounts to -0.06. The corresponding parameters for couples with
income larger than 100,000 e are 0.18 and -0.02. Those estimates include labor supply
responses both along the intensive and the extensive margin. Uncompensated elasticities
are somewhat higher for earners with lower income levels.9 Lack of data prevents us from
further di¤erentiating the extent of behavioral responses within smaller groups at the top
of the income distribution.
3.3 Consumption tax
Consumption is taxed by means of various instruments in Germany. We have used a
microsimulation model based on the German Income and Consumption Survey to estimate
the average consumption tax rate for the top decile of the income distribution. The main
tax is the VAT at a regular rate of 19 %. According to our simulations, roughly 3/4
of the consumption expenditure of the top decile is taxed at the standard rate, the rest
being partly subject to the reduced 7 % VAT rate and partly VAT-exempted. To compute
the overall tax rate on consumption, we have also taken energy taxation, the insurance
tax, taxes on real estate, the motor vehicle tax, taxes on alcohol and tobacco and other
quantitatively minor taxes into account. As a result, our simulations suggest that the
average consumption tax for the high-income earners amounts to about 20 %.10
3.4 Results






A  (1  )(ymS   y) + (ymC   2y)
(1  )(uSymS   Sy) + (uCymC   2Cy)
:
8Details of the microsimulation model are discussed in Steiner and Wrohlich (2008). The estimated
elasticities are obtained from data about wage earners. Separate labor supply elasticities for the self-
employed cannot be estimated because of data limitations. The only study that estimates such elasticities
without focussing on a special occupation appears to be Parker et al. (2005), where US data is used.
The estimated wage elasticities are very close to zero, while labor supply is found to be a¤ected by a
self-insurance motive.
9They range from 0.25 to 0.3. Income e¤ects are about -0.07 for singles and -0.02 for couples.
10Details of the simulations can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Table 4: Optimal top marginal income tax rates for various thresholds and various income
concepts




50,000 0.5621 0.6007 0.6554
60,000 0.5837 0.6157 0.6751
70,000 0.6017 0.6253 0.6875
80,000 0.6144 0.6318 0.6989
90,000 0.6237 0.6348 0.7055
100,000 0.6320 0.6377 0.7111
200,000 0.6621 0.6464 0.7361
300,000 0.6730 0.6546 0.7454
400,000 0.6787 0.6595 0.7490
500,000 0.6780 0.6625 0.7509
600,000 0.6774 0.6620 0.7524
700,000 0.6781 0.6647 0.7524
800,000 0.6794 0.6696 0.7533
900,000 0.6789 0.6730 0.7531
1,000,000 0.6764 0.6710 0.7525
1,100,000 0.6775 0.6747 0.7520
1,200,000 0.6785 0.6743 0.7525
1,300,000 0.6795 0.6740 0.7511
1,400,000 0.6783 0.6742 0.7513
1,500,000 0.6842 0.6798 0.7528
Using the empirical ndings reported above, we set t = 0:2, uS = 0:14, S =  0:06,
uC = 0:18 and C =  0:02. Optimal top rates are computed for various cuto¤s for annual
incomes, ranging from 50,000 e (100,000 e for couples) to 1,500,000 e (3,000,000 for
couples). Results for all three income measures are reported in Table 4.
Optimal tax rates start at a level close to 56 % for an income cuto¤ of 50,000 e and
converge to a level of about 2/3 for higher income levels.11 Convergence is obtained at
threshold levels between 300,000 e and 400,000 e. Thus, our ndings suggest that the
optimal asymptotic marginal tax rate for Germany is about 2/3. A cuto¤of at least about
350,000 e for singles (700,000 e for couples) would be required to implement an optimal
taxation of top incomes, with the remaining components of the German tax system being
held xed.
Our estimations of optimal tax rates are not much a¤ected if the incomes of profes-
sionals are included in the income measure. They are signicantly larger if the income of
business owners is included. That is due to the higher level of concentration of business
income, as shown by Figures 1 and 2.
11The optimal marginal income tax rates for cuto¤s 50,000 e and 60,000 e in Table 4 are slightly over-
estimated since we neglect the tax component in the contributions to the old-age and the unemployment
insurance that are made by those taxpayers.
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4 Qualications
With respect to their policy implications, our results should be qualied in at least two
respects. First, the use of labor supply elasticities rather than taxable income elasticities
should be discussed. Second, there are determinants of optimal top tax rates that are
absent from the theoretical framework on which our estimations are based.
4.1 Taxable income vs. labor supply elasticities
We have used elasticity estimates obtained from an investigation of labor supply in Ger-
many. Those elasticities only incorporate the e¤ect of taxation on labor market partic-
ipation and number of hours worked. Households can however respond to taxation also
through other channels a¤ecting e.g. human capital accumulation, choice of career, and
e¤ort per hour. Unfortunately, there exists very little direct empirical evidence about the
e¤ect of income taxation on those dimensions of taxpayer behavior. Because of conicting
income and substitution e¤ects, one cannot even conclude from theory that traditional
labor supply elasticities constitute a lower bound of the overall response of taxpayers.12
An alternative to labor supply elasticities that has received much attention in the
literature is the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal tax rate. In
the modelling framework adopted above, the two elasticity concepts are equivalent. In
practice, taxable income elasticity does not only mirror labor market participation and
hours but also e¤ort and other dimensions of work intensity that are neglected by labor
supply elasticities. Thus, the taxable income elasticity might be a better indicator of the
e¢ ciency costs of taxation and a more reliable way to quantify optimal top tax rates.13
Empirical elasticities of taxable income are typically larger than labor supply elasticities.
For the U.S., Saez et al. (2011) consider the most reliable longer-run estimates to lie in
the range from 0.12 to 0.4, with very small income e¤ects for top incomes. For Germany,
Gottfried and Schellhorn (2004) use data from a tax return panel for the years 1988 and
1990. Their preferred estimates of the compensated elasticity range from 0.38 to 0.58,
with somewhat higher values for high income taxpayers who are not wage earners and
lower values for top wage earners. However, their estimated elasticities widely vary with
12In case of long-term decisions about education and career, it is the expected tax rate that matters
and there seems to be no attempt to empirically measure those expectations. Notice that the elasticity
of expected future tax rates with respect to the actual rate needs not be positive: once the intertemporal
budget contraint of the government is taken into account by agents, a higher tax rate today may decrease
the tax rate that is expected for tomorrow.
13That presumption was forcefully argued by Feldstein (1999). However, Chetty (2009) shows that
under plausible conditions taxable income elasticity leads to overstate the deadweight loss of taxation,
especially so in the case of taxation of high incomes.
13
specication and estimation method. Similarly sensitive estimation results are obtained
by Gottfried and Witczak (2009), who use data for the years 2001-2004. For taxpayers
with an annual income above 50,000 e, they nd compensated elasticities of 0.25 for
the self-employed and 1.48 for wage earners. For France, Cabannes and Landais (2008)
estimate the elasticity of taxable income using an exhaustive panel of top taxpayers in a
period during which three large reforms of the tax code took place. They nd that the
taxable income elasticity for top earners is around 0.15.
Given the lack of precision with which taxable income elasticities are estimated at the
top of the distribution, their use to quantify top tax rates leads to a rather wide spectrum
of values. Applying to our data an elasticity of 0.15 - the one found by Cabannes and
Landais (2008) - and assuming no income e¤ects yields convergence to an optimal tax rate
of 72 %. Assuming instead a compensated elasticity of 0.3 and no income e¤ect reduces
the asymptotic rate to about 55 %, while an elasticity of 0.4 - the upper-bound estimate
suggested by Saez et al. (2011) - brings it down to 47 %.
The main problem of using the elasticity of taxable income is that it captures reactions
that have little to do with e¢ ciency costs and revenue losses for the government. As
pointed out e.g. by Saez et al. (2011), reductions in reported incomes may simply be due
to a shift away from income subject to the personal income tax to other forms of taxable
income, such as corporate income. They may also mirror a shifting of reported income
across scal years. A similar scal externality is present when reductions in reported
incomes are due to increased tax evasion: in that case, it is governmental revenue from
ning evaders that is bound to increase.14 The scal externality may also involve a
shift of tax liabilities across taxpayers, e.g. in the case of top executives and ordinary
shareholders: higher executive compensation after a tax rate cut may be the result of more
e¤ort by CEOs to make a bigger intake in the rms prots at the expense of shareholders
(taxable) returns. The scal externality may also take the form of a reduction of public
expenditure, as in the case of charitable giving: a decrease of taxable income may mirror
increased tax-deductible charitable contributions which in turn reduce the costs of poverty
alleviation for the government.
Estimates of the labor supply elasticity neglect some dimensions of taxpayer behavior,
like human capital formation and intensity of work, that are implicitly accounted for
in the basic model of optimal income taxation and are likely to a¤ect the optimal top
14Chetty (2009) shows that if taxpayers are rational and risk neutral, the tax revenue lost because
of evasion is exactly recouped by increased nes collected by the government. Furthermore, changes in
reported incomes may mirror changes in the supply of tax shelters by accountancy rms. As shown
by Damjanovic and Ulph (2010), taking the supply side of non-compliance into account, a higher top
marginal tax rate can actually improve tax discipline.
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marginal tax rate. Estimates of taxable income elasticities have the merit of incorporating
responses in terms of changed work intensity. But they also mirror changes in tax evasion,
avoidance, and rent-seeking, i.e. reactions that are associated with scal externalities.
Arguably, many high-income earners face a relatively large set of possibilities of evasion,
avoidance and rent-seeking, while they often seem committed to putting much e¤ort into
their work. This suggests that labor supply elasticities may be a more reliable instrument
than taxable income elasticities to capture the incentive costs of taxation that are relevant
for the determination of the optimal top marginal tax rate. Taxable income elasticities
may instead be especially useful when assessing the role of loopholes in the tax code and
the scope for increased tax auditing.
4.2 Further determinants of the optimal top tax rate
Besides the incentive costs of taxation that are at the core of the traditional optimal
taxation model, additional factors may signicantly a¤ect the socially optimal tax rate
for high incomes. We now briey discuss how that tax rate may be a¤ected by the
international mobility of top earners, social externalities related to income polarization,
and attitudes toward risk.
4.2.1 Migration
A distinctive concern of governments, especially in Europe, is the threat of migration by
high income individuals. As shown by Simula and Trannoy (2010), adding the possibility
of migration to the standard Mirrleesian model tends to lower the marginal tax rate
for top earners. Their simulations for France suggest that the e¤ect from migration is
sizeable.15 Simula and Trannoy assume that when a top earner migrates, the domestic
government loses an amount of tax revenue exactly equal to the income tax that was
paid by that top earner. However, it is likely that in reality the scal consequences of
migration strongly di¤er according to the occupation of migrants. By way of an example,
migration of scientists is more harmful than assumed in the Simula and Trannoys model if
scientists generate positive spillovers on the productivity of their co-workers. Conversely,
migration of top managers may have tiny e¤ects on collected taxes if their remuneration
is mainly due to informational rents that are necessary to mitigate moral hazard and
adverse selection problems. Replacement of the migrated manager by a new one may
entail a new equilibrium where only the income tax on the reservation wage - rather than
on the managers compensation - is actually lost by the treasury.
15However, Young and Varner (2011) empirically estimate migration responses of millionaires to higher
income taxation in New Jersey and nd only little responsiveness.
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Taking the possibility of migration into account tends to lower the optimal top tax
rate and points to the contraints for policy makers that result from international tax
competition. The threat of migration might be less severe if migration of top earners makes
housing more a¤ordable for the poor. As shown by Glazer et al. (2008), if land quality is
vertically di¤erentiated and rents are endogenous, a tax which induces emigration of the
rich reduces demand for desirable locations, thereby raising the utility of the poor.
4.2.2 Social and political externalities
To the extent that a high income concentration creates negative externalities, a higher
top tax rate may not only raise more revenue but also improve allocative e¢ ciency. An
example of those externalities is when the e¤ort to increase ones income is motivated by a
quest for social status or higher relative position. If the marginal utility of consumption is
decreasing while the utility from rank is convex, status-seeking motives may be distictively
powerful for top income earners - something which is consistent with the observed large
number of hours worked by the working rich. The quest for status entails a negative exter-
nality since the rank improvement by an individual causes a rank worsening for somebody
else. As shown by Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) and Oswald (1983), optimal tax rates
are higher when a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses motive is operative; Corneo (2002) shows
that a progressive income tax can even generate a Pareto improvement when the Gini
coe¢ cient of the distribution of skills is low. In principle, feelings of relative deprivation,
as formalized by Yitzhaki (1979), might generate an optimal top tax rate that exceeds
the revenue-maximizing one considered in this paper.
Further negative externalities associated with a high level of income concentration
are the disproportionate inuence of the wealthy in politics and the increase of returns to
criminal activity. Corneo (2006) and Petrova (2008) develop models where higher inequal-
ity is associated with more media capture; Petrova also o¤ers some empirical support for
that prediction. Dahlberg and Gustavsson (2008) discuss the relationship between income
inequality and crime and present some empirical evidence suggesting that inequality in
permanent income leads to more crime.
4.2.3 Risk taking
Under income uncertainty, income taxes generally a¤ect the amount of risk taking by
households, while redistributive taxation can generate valuable additional insurance if
nancial markets are incomplete.16 Those aspects can matter for the level of the optimal
16Early contributions include Eaton and Rose (1980) and Varian (1980); see Boadway and Sato (2011)
and Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) for recent updates.
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marginal tax rate for top earners, the more so as many of them are entrepreneurs or
otherwise self-employed individuals subject to considerable income risk.
From the viewpoint of the poor, risk taking by the rich should be encouraged if risk
is idiosyncratic and aggregate risk is una¤ected. In that case, more risk taking tends to
increase aggregate taxable income and tax revenue available for redistribution. If instead
individual risks are positively correlated, encouraging risk taking leads to an increase of
aggregate risk and there is a trade-o¤involving the expected tax revenue and its variability.
Simply increasing the top marginal tax rate tends to reduce the private gain from taking
risk in case of good luck. The resulting e¤ect on individual risk-taking involves conicting
income and substitution e¤ects, whereby the latter is likely to dominate, i.e. a higher top
marginal tax rate may adversely a¤ect entrepreneurship. If more risk taking is socially
desirable, our estimations of the optimal top tax rate - that neglect risk - may then be
too high.
Empirical ndings by Cullen and Gordon (2007) suggest that the magnitude of the
e¤ect of income taxation on risk taking is small because successful entrepreneurs have
the option to incorporate or to avoid high personal income taxes by underreporting their
income. Furthermore, when income is uncertain, the government can use a high marginal
income tax rate on top incomes in combination with low rates on low incomes in order to
provide implicit insurance for potential entrepreneurs and thereby encourage risk taking.
5 Conclusion
The enhanced ability to pay of top income recipients makes them an attractive tax base for
governments in need of additional revenues. However, the optimal level of taxation of top
incomes heavily depends on the shape of the upper tail of the income distribution and on
the responsiveness of top taxpayers. This paper has o¤ered a twofold contribution to the
literature on the top marginal tax rate that maximizes the tax revenue for the government.
First, we have extended existing formulas to the empirically relevant case where couples
are taxed according to income splitting between spouses and where not only income but
also consumption is taxed. Second, we have used those formulas to compute the optimal
top marginal income tax rate for Germany. Estimations based on an exhaustive dataset
of top taxpayers suggest that the optimal asymptotic tax rate is close to 2/3 and that
a marginal tax rate at that level should be applied only to incomes much larger than
those subject to the actual top tax rate. The only incentive e¤ect incorporated in our
investigation is the one exerted by a higher top marginal tax rate upon labor supply.
Taking the possibility of migration of top earners and the e¤ects of taxation on risk-
17
taking into account is likely to reduce the optimal taxation of top incomes in Germany,
while taking social and political externalities from income polarization into account is
likely to increase it. Incorporating those e¤ects and estimating their magnitudes is an
important task for future research.
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APPENDIX: Figures and Tables for 2004
Figure 3: Singlesincome distribution
Figure 4: Couplesincome distribution
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Table 5: Wage Income
Singles Couples Total
y¯ nr. of obs. 2y¯ nr. of obs nr. of obs 
50,000 936,510 100,000 501,249 1,437,759 0.349
60,000 493,338 120,000 268,206 761,545 0.352
70,000 254,282 140,000 162,561 416,842 0.390
80,000 152,765 160,000 107,845 260,610 0.414
90,000 101,996 180,000 76,503 178,499 0.429
100,000 75,141 200,000 56,541 131,682 0.429
200,000 10,931 400,000 9,261 20,192 0.459
300,000 3,909 600,000 3,571 7,480 0.477
400,000 1,939 800,000 1,911 3,850 0.496
500,000 1,177 1,000,000 1,185 2,362 0.502
600,000 775 1,200,000 775 1,550 0.500
700,000 569 1,400,000 574 1,143 0.502
800,000 414 1,600,000 424 838 0.506
900,000 333 1,800,000 319 652 0.489
1,000,000 284 2,000,000 256 540 0.474
1,100,000 228 2,200,000 210 438 0.480
1,200,000 187 2,400,000 178 365 0.488
1,300,000 172 2,600,000 149 321 0.464
1,400,000 151 2,800,000 126 277 0.455
1,500,000 126 3,000,000 109 235 0.464
Table 6: Wage and Professional Income
Singles Couples Total
y¯ nr. of obs. 2y¯ nr. of obs nr. of obs 
50,000 1,059,231 100,000 655,933 1,715,164 0.382
60,000 583,474 120,000 389,477 972,951 0.400
70,000 328,106 140,000 258,295 586,401 0.440
80,000 207,516 160,000 183,628 391,144 0.469
90,000 147,827 180,000 137,072 284,898 0.481
100,000 113,860 200,000 105,292 219,152 0.480
200,000 21,012 400,000 18,672 39,684 0.471
300,000 7,827 600,000 6,847 14,674 0.467
400,000 3,950 800,000 3,399 7,349 0.462
500,000 2,355 1,000,000 1,981 4,335 0.457
600,000 1,526 1,200,000 1,265 2,791 0.453
700,000 1,072 1,400,000 885 1,957 0.452
800,000 789 1,600,000 628 1,417 0.443
900,000 609 1,800,000 468 1,077 0.434
1,000,000 489 2,000,000 374 863 0.433
1,100,000 399 2,200,000 292 691 0.423
1,200,000 328 2,400,000 241 569 0.424
1,300,000 291 2,600,000 211 502 0.420
1,400,000 245 2,800,000 174 419 0.415
1,500,000 201 3,000,000 143 344 0.416
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Table 7: Wage, Professional and Business Income
Singles Couples Total
y¯ nr. of obs. 2y¯ nr. of obs nr. of obs 
50,000 1,193,973 100,000 776,414 1,970,387 0.394
60,000 671,997 120,000 475,586 1,147,583 0.414
70,000 396,264 140,000 324,256 720,520 0.450
80,000 260,795 160,000 236,304 497,099 0.475
90,000 191,975 180,000 180,207 372,182 0.484
100,000 149,885 200,000 141,729 291,614 0.486
200,000 35,047 400,000 31,773 66,820 0.475
300,000 16,399 600,000 14,390 30,789 0.467
400,000 10,100 800,000 8,671 18,771 0.462
500,000 7,066 1,000,000 5,915 12,980 0.456
600,000 5,360 1,200,000 4,333 9,692 0.447
700,000 4,309 1,400,000 3,375 7,684 0.439
800,000 3,511 1,600,000 2,678 6,188 0.433
900,000 2,974 1,800,000 2,241 5,215 0.430
1,000,000 2,592 2,000,000 1,910 4,502 0.424
1,100,000 2,273 2,200,000 1,640 3,913 0.419
1,200,000 2,015 2,400,000 1,413 3,429 0.412
1,300,000 1,841 2,600,000 1,261 3,103 0.407
1,400,000 1,653 2,800,000 1,116 2,770 0.403
1,500,000 1,506 3,000,000 988 2,494 0.396
Table 8: Optimal top marginal income tax rates for various thresholds and various income
concepts




50,000 0.5479 0.5893 0.6421
60,000 0.5598 0.5993 0.6595
70,000 0.5827 0.6123 0.6757
80,000 0.5978 0.6205 0.6872
90,000 0.6077 0.6235 0.6943
100,000 0.6131 0.6242 0.6998
200,000 0.6426 0.6296 0.7289
300,000 0.6531 0.6345 0.7410
400,000 0.6563 0.6375 0.7457
500,000 0.6561 0.6392 0.7485
600,000 0.6602 0.6426 0.7505
700,000 0.6559 0.6426 0.7511
800,000 0.6583 0.6458 0.7528
900,000 0.6590 0.6475 0.7528
1,000,000 0.6547 0.6450 0.7524
1,100,000 0.6541 0.6467 0.7526
1,200,000 0.6517 0.6459 0.7532
1,300,000 0.6465 0.6368 0.7520
1,400,000 0.6443 0.6385 0.7525
1,500,000 0.6444 0.6441 0.7530
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